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PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

IMPROVING PROCEDURE ON JUDGMENT AND
APPEAL IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES*
By

T

LESTER B. ORFIELD**

task of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure is one of great magnitude. But with respect to problems and principles of judgment and appeal, it has been lightened
in no small degree by the fact that more than eight years ago,
on May 7, 1934, to be exact, the Supreme Court promulgated the
Criminal Appeals Rules." The Court in doing so proceeded under
the authority of Acts of Congress, passed in 1933 and 1934.' No
HE

*Address before Section of Criminal Law of the American Bar Association at Detroit, Michigan, August 25, 1942. The address, of course, represents only the views of the speaker.
**Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; member of the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure of the United States Supreme
Court; author of Criminal Appeals in America (1939), The Amending
of the Federal Constitution (1942).
'The title employed by the Court was: "Rules of Practice and Procedure, after plea of guilty, verdict or finding of guilt, in Criminal Cases
brought in the District Courts of the United States and in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia." See (1933) 292 U. S. 659, 54 Sup.
Ct. XXXVII, 78 L. Ed. 1512. The term "Criminal Appeals Rules" is
used in White v. United States, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1935) 80 F. (2d) 515, 576;
Ray v. United States, (1937) 301 U. S. 158, 57 Sup. Ct. 700, 701, 81 L.
Ed. 976, and in several other decisions.
"-Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119, 47 Stat. at L. 904, as amended by Act
of Mar. 8, 1934, ch. 49. 48 Stat. at L. 399, 18 U. S. C. sec. 688, 18
U. S. C. A. sec. 688, 28 U. S. C. sec. 723a, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723a, which
reads as follows: "That the Supreme Court of the United States shall
have the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of practice and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings after verdict, or finding of
guilt by the court if a jury has been waived, or plea of guilty, in criminal
cases in district courts of the United States, including the District Courts
of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Canal Zone, and Virgin Islands, in the
Supreme Courts of the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, in
the United States Courts for China, in the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals, in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and in the
Supreme Court of the United States: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to give the Supreme- Court the power to abridge
the right of the accused to apply for withdrawal of a plea of guilty, if such
application be made within ten days after entry of such plea, and before
sentence is imposed.
"See. 2. The right of appeal shall continue in those cases in which
appeals are now authorized by law, but the rules made as herein authorized
may prescribe the times for and manner of taking appeals and applying
for writs of certiorari and preparing records and bills of exceptions and
the conditions on which supersedeas or bail may be allowed.
"Sec. 3. The Supreme Court may fix the dates when such rules shall
take effect and the extent to which they shall apply to proceedings then
pending, and after they become effective all laws in conflict therewith
shall be of no further force."
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advisory committee was then appointed to assist the Court. The
Department of Justice under the direction of Solicitor General
Thacher did the preliminary work for the Court at the request of
the Court.' We have been operating under the Criminal Appeals
Rules four years longer than under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.

4

When our committee was appointed on February 3, 1941, it
was authorized by the appointing order to prepare and submit a
draft of rules dealing with the procedure prior to judgment and
appeal. This order was based on the Act of Congress of June 29,
1940.- But, while the scope of activity of the Advisory Committee
was limited, this was not true of the Court itself since the Acts
of 1933 and 1934 were still in effect. It soon became apparent
to the Committee that a well integrated and symmetrical system
of procedure required a reworking of all of its parts. It also
appeared that certain improvements might be made in the Criminal
Appeals Rules themselves.6 The Court readily came to the aid of
the Committee by an order of November 17, 1941, authorizing and
directing the Committee to make such recommendations as may be
deemed advisable with respect to amendments to the Criminal
Appeals Rules. 7
Two subsequent statutes have made even more imperative a
revision of the Criminal Appeals Rules. The Contempt Rules
3
Nineteen proposed rules, a proposed promulgating order, and notes
thereon
were submitted on May 26, 1933.
4
The rules became effective on September 1, 1934. See the last paragraph of the promulgating order. Unlike the Civil Rules no submission to
Congress
was necessary.
5
Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. at L. 688, 18 U. S. C. sec.
687, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 687; 28 U. S. C. sec. 723 a-l, 28 U. S. C. A.
sec. 6723 a-l.
That the rules have substantially accelerated the process of review
is pointed out in Note, (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 988-992, Tables I-V.
As to certain cases sampled, between verdict and the judgment of the
Circuit Court, six days were gained in the Second Circuit, 125 in the
Third, 70 in the Fourth, 94 in the Fifth, 69 in the Sixth, 128 in the
Seventh, 38 in the Eighth, 123 in the Ninth, and 84 in the Tenth, though
70 were lost in two cases examined in the First Circuit. The average
days gained was 77.
7(1941) 314 U. S ......... , 62 Sup. Ct. XI. "The Advisory Committee
appointed February 3, 1941, to assist the Court in the preparation of rules
of pleading, practice and procedure with respect to proceedings prior to and
including verdict, or finding of guilty or not guilty, in criminal cases in
district courts of the United States, is authorized and directed to make such
recommendations as may be deemed advisable respecting amendments to
the rules promulgated by this Court pursuant to the provisions of the
Act of Congress, approved March 8, 1934, amending an Act entitled 'An
Act to give the Supreme Court of the United States authority to prescribe Rules of Practice and Procedure with respect to proceedings in
criminal cases after verdict' (Act of February 24, 1933, ch. 119, 28
U. S. C. A. sec. 723(a)."
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Act of November 21, 1941, extended the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court to "proceedings to punish for criminal contempt
of court."- This act covered all stages of criminal contempt procedure including judgment and appeal. The Government Appeals
Act of May 9, 1942, authorized the Supreme Court to lay down
rules of procedure as to appeals taken by the government." The
same act permitted the government to take appeals to the Circuit
Courts of Appeals in cases where previously no right of appeal to
any court had lain."" Prior to the Act no appeal by the government in criminal cases lay to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The promulgating order of the Criminal Appeals Rules gave
them but a limited territorial coverage, continental United States
and the District of Columbia. On March 17, 1941, the Supreme
Court issued an order effective July 1, 1941, extending the operation of the rules to Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone,
and the Virgin Islands. 1' It may reasonably be anticipated that
this increased coverage will not be altered.
JUDGMENT

Rule I. The first problem I should like to raise is with respect
to Criminal Appeals Rule I, entitled "Sentence.""' That rule does
very little to encourage the use of pre-sentence investigations. The
,Act of Nov. 21, 1941, ch. 492, 55 Stat. at L. 779, 18 U. S. C. A. sec.
689. If the present Criminal Appeals Rules apply at all to criminal contempt proceedings, they do so only in an extremely narrow range of cases.
See Nye v. United States, (1941) 313 U. S. 33, 43-44, 61 Sup. Ct. 810, 85
L. Ed. 1172. It would seem that such range might include 1) the criminal
contempt cases where the right to jury trial is given as under the NorrisLa Guardia Act and 2) any criminal contempt case in which the defendant
pleads guilty.
'Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, 56 Stat. at L. 271, IS U. S. C. A. sec.
682. By an order of Oct. 26, 1942, the Supreme Court authorized the
Advisory Committee to make recommendations with respect to government appeals. (U.S. 1942) 63 Sup. Ct. XII.
,'That is to say, in cases not involving the validity or construction of a
statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.
11(1941) 312 U. S. 721, 61 Sup. Ct. CLIII, 85 L. Ed. 731.
1
'For Rule I as amended on May 24, 1937, see (1937) 301 U. S. 717,
57 Sup. Ct. LXII, 81 L. Ed. 1373: "I. Sentence. After a plea of guilty,
or a verdict of guilty by a jury or finding of guilty by the trial court where
a jury is waived, and except as provided in the Act of March 4, 1925,
c. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, sentence shall be imposed without delay unless (1) a
motion for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty, or in arrest of judgment or for
a new trial, is pending, or the trial court is of opinion that there is reasonable ground for such a motion; or (2) the condition or character of the
defendant, or other pertinent matters, should be investigated in the interest
of justice before sentence is imposed. The judgment setting forth the sentence shall be signed by the judge who imposes the sentence and shall be
entered by the clerk.
"Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or continue or
increase the amount of bail."
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trial judge is left entirely free to determine the sentence within,
of course, the statutory limits on the basis of his own hunches or
observation. It seems to me that it would be a salutary thing to
lay down a rule making pre-sentence investigation the regular
procedure: This may be done by a provision that investigation
must be made unless the court affirmatively orders that no investigation be made. Such a rule is flexible enough to permit the court
to deal with the situation where such investigation would interfere
with the work of the probation services in supervising persons on
probation or parole. Some courts are not sufficiently staffed to
permit of pre-sentence investigation in all cases. The rule ought
to provide for pre-sentence investigation even where there is to
be no probation since such investigation will aid in the imposition
of sentence and in correctional treatment.
It might be well to have the rule prescribe in detail concerning
the report of the pre-sentence investigation. This report should
contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such facts
as to the defendant's traits and the circumstances affecting his
behavior as might assist in the imposition of sentence or the
granting of probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant. Thus the report would constitute a thorough social case
-history of the defendant. The report should by all means be kept
confidential, and should be available only to such persons as prison
officials or parole authorities. It might be well to provide expressly that the report shall be available only to such persons or
agencies as the court in its discretion may direct, and upon such
conditions as the court may impose.
The rule might also prescribe the time for the making of the
pre-sentence investigation. Because of Anglo-American doctrines,
such as the presumption of innocence, the defendant should have
the right to object to such an investigation being made before the
finding of guilt. An earlier investigation would, however, permit
a more thorough and less hurried study and, therefore, if he
expressly consents, such investigation should be permitted.
Perhaps it would be desirable that the court be required to
state the sociological, psychological, psychiatric, and any other
bases of the sentence which it imposes. It is to be doubted, however, that so novel a proposal would be acceptable to the courts
and to the bar. Some will object that this is an attempt to reduce
the inherently irrational to the rational!
A problem of the non-sociological side of sentencing is this:
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How deal with the situation where a comprehensive sentence on
a number of counts is imposed beyond that which could have been
imposed on one count and it subsequently develops that the conviction on one or more counts is invalid? The solution undoubtedly is a rule that if the total of the sentences imposed exceeds the
sentence which may be imposed under any count, then the court
shall state separately the sentence which it is imposing for each
count.
Neither Rule I nor any of the other Criminal Appeals Rules
deals with the problem of 'eduction or correction of sentence.
Perhaps a rule is desirable to the effect that a motion for the correction of an illegal sentence may be made at any time. But a
motion to reduce a legally proper but criminologically excessive
sentence should be limited to some such period as sixty days after
sentence. The abuse under existing law has been that trial judges
by entry of orders from time to time have extended for the purposes of a particular case the term of court at which a sentence
was imposed for periods of years, and have granted motions for
reduction a long time after the sentence was imposed. This has
been done on the theory that reduction of sentence is always
permissible during the same term of court. 13 In one notorious case
a district judge, after imposing a ten year sentence, which the
defendant began to serve, extended the court term for three successive years and then, on motion of the defendant, modified the
judgment by reducing the sentence to the time already served.
Such action by the court may fairly be said to have amounted to
an encroachment upon the executive power to pardon.
Rule II. A number of problems arise in connection with Criminal Appeals Rule II, which deals with motions by the defendant
after verdict or finding or plea of guilty. The rule does not specify
the grounds for motion for new trial. Under existing law the
grounds are undoubtedly very broad and comprehensive but to
make doubly sure that relief will be available in every meritorious
case should not the rule expressly provide that a new trial be
grantable whenever required in the interests of justice? The
present rule does not specify the grounds for motion in arrest of
judgment. Should not this motion which has been unduly broad
in the past be confined to cases where the indictment or information fails to state an offense or where the court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged? It would seem that other defects
'UUnited States v. Benz, (1931) 282 U. S. 304, 51 Sup. Ct. 113, 75

L. Ed. 354.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

and objections formerly raised by way of motion in arrest of
judgment should be raised by motion before trial. Defendants
should not be permitted to raise the same point over and over
14
again except as to the most vital matters.
The present Rule 11 (2) lays down a rigid time limit of three
days after verdict in which to move in arrest of judgment or for
a new trial. This may on occasion be unfair to the defendant.
Would it not be well to introduce a reasonable amount of flexibility
by a provision that such motions may also be made within such
further time as may be fixed by the court during the three day
period? The present Rule II (3) lays down a sixty day limit
as to motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence except in capital cases. The exception as to capital cases
was itself incorporated into the rules only by way of amendment
on May 31, 1938.1' In actual life newly-discovered evidence may
turn up much later. In order that the defendant may have judicial
relief should we not remove all time limitations upon the making
of motions on the ground of newly-discovered evidence? The
present Rule II (4) provides that a motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty must be made within ten days after entry of such plea.
Is not this an undue hardship on the defendant, and should we
not adopt the rule now prevalent in many states which permits
withdrawal of the plea at any time before sentence?16
14H. L. McClintock, Indictment by Grand Jury, (1941) 26 MINNESOTA
141, 171-176. For the Rule as amended May 31, 1938, see
(1938) 304 U. S. 592, 58 Sup. Ct. CXXVIII, 82 L. Ed. 1561: "II. Motions.
(1) Motions after verdict or finding of guilt, or to withdraw a plea of
guilty, shall be determined promptly.
"(2) Save as provided in subdivision (3) of this Rule, motions in arrest
of judgment, or for a new trial, shall be made within three (3) days after
verdict or finding of guilt.
"(3) Except in capital cases, a motion for a new trial solely upon the
ground of newly-discovered evidence may be made within sixty (60) days
after final judgment, without regard to the expiration of the term at which
judgment was rendered, unless an appeal has been taken and in that event
the trial court may entertain the motion only on remand of the case by
the appellate court for that purpose, and such remand may be made at any
time before final judgment. In capital cases the motion may be made at any
time before execution of the judgment.
"(4) A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be made within ten
(10) days after entry of such plea and before sentence is imposed."
35(1938) 304 U. S. 592, 58 Sup. Ct. CXXVIII, 82 L. Ed. 1561. Under
sec. 362 of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure (1930)
a motion on the ground of newly-discovered evidence "may be made within
one year after the rendition of the verdict or the finding of the court or at
a later time if the court for good cause so permits."
16Sec. 230 of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure
(1930) goes even further and permits setting aside of a judgment so that
the plea may be withdrawn.
LAW REVIEW
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The present Criminal Appeals Rule II is entitled "Motions"
but deals only with motion for new trial, motion in arrest of
judgment, and motion to withdraw a plea of guilty. Should there
not be a rule covering the modern practice on motion which has
been substituted for the writ of error corain nobis.17 In my opinion, though not many cases come within that remedy, it is not the
function of our committee to abolish or whittle down small rights
of defendants any more than large rights. Hence, the remedy
should be preserved and it should be made clear that the time
limits governing other motions do not govern it.
APPEAL

When our Committee took up the subject of appeal, we found
available for aid and assistance not only the Criminal Appeals
Rules, Rules III--XIII, but also Rules 72 through 76 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with civil appeals. We
have had for our study the ideas of the Supreme Court in 1934, its
ideas in 1938, eight years of experience with the former ideas' s
and four years with the latter.
One of the important problems in connection with appeal is
the procedure to be adopted in cases of direct appeal from the
district court to the Supreme Court. I believe I am correct in
saying that all such appeals are taken by the government.", The
present Criminal Appeals Rules do not seem to cover such appeals.-' Most such appeals are taken before verdict, so that only
17

That the remedy still exists and is not limited by the time limits
fixed in Rule II, see Robinson v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1941) 118
F. (2d) 998, 1000. For a detailed analysis of the writ of error coram nwbis,
see Orfield, Writ of Error Coram Nobis, (1932) 10 Neb. L. Bull. 314;
Orfield, Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Nebraska, (1933) 11 Neb. L. Bull.
421; Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice, (1934)
20 Va. L. Rev. 423. See also Note, (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 744; Note,
(1941) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 963, 966; Note, (1940) 19 Neb. L. Bull. 150.
'sFor the considerable number of cases interpreting the Criminal
Appeals Rules, see annotations in 18 U. S. C. A. (1942 Supp.) sec. 688.
See also Note, (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 983; Orfield, Criminal Appeals in
America, (1939) 253-258; Orfield, The Criminal Appeals Rules as Interpreted in the Decisions, (Dec. 1942) North Carolina L. Rev.
10Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 245-246.
-°Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States, (1936) sec. 163; Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America,
(1939) 253; cf. Nye v. United States. (1941) 313 U. S. 33, 43-44, 61
Sup. Ct. 810, 85 L. Ed. 1172. The Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, 56 Stat.
at L. 271, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 682, expressly authorizes rule making with
respect to direct appeals by the government under the Criminal Appeals
Act of 1908. It is to be noted that the Attorney General in his prepared
rules transmitted to the Chief Justice on May 26, 1933, expressly excepted
"Proceedings under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2564,
34 Stat. at L. 1246."
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a very narrow range of cases could be covered even if there was
an intention to cover them. Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure lays down the procedure as to direct civil appeals.
The civil rule did not improve the existing procedure but left
it substantially as it was. It seems to me that the criminal rule
ought to improve upon the civil rule by abolishing the petition for
allowance of appeal and the citation on appeal and substituting a
notice of appeal as is done in Criminal Appeals Rule III and Civil
Rule 73 (a), governing appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
If it be provided in cases of appeal by the defendant that bail
shall be allowed only when it appears that a substantial question
is involved, a separate rule should be laid down as to bail where
the government appeals. In the case of a government appeal, the
fact that a substantial question is involved ought to diminish and
not increase the possibility of obtaining bail. It is questionable
whether the rules should imply that the government will appeal
where no substantial question is involved. The solution may be a
rule such as Section 439 of the American Law Institute Code of
Criminal Procedure leaving the matter to the discretion of the
courts. Possibly the defendant should be admitted to bail on his own
recognizance as provided in the Government Appeals Act of 1942.1
Ride III. Under the present law when the government appeals,
it is given thirty days in which to take its appeal. Criminal Appeals
Rule III gives the defendant only five days after the entry of
judgment of conviction in which to take his appeal. Possibly the
time for the government should be reduced to correspond more
nearly.2 2 An alternative solution may be to increase the time of
21Act of May 9, 1942, ch. 295, 56 Stat. at L. 271, 18 U. S. C. A.
sec. 682.
22"III. Appeals. An appeal shall be taken within five (5) days after the
entry of judgment of conviction, except that where a motion for a new
trial has been made within the time specified in subdivision (2) of Rule
II, the appeal may be taken within five (5) days after entry of the order
denying the motion.
"Petitions for allowance of appeal, and citations, in cases governed by
these rules are abolished.
"Appeals shall be taken by filing with the clerk of the trial court a
notice, in duplicate, stating that the defendant appeals from the judgment,
and by serving a copy of the notice upon the United States Attorney. The
notice of appeal shall set forth the title of the case, the names and
addresses of the appellant and appellant's attorney, a general statement of
the nature of the offense, the date of the judgment, the sentence imposed, and, if the appellant is in custody, the prison where appellant is
confined. The notice shall also contain a succinct statement of the grounds
of appeal and shall follow substantially the form hereto annexed." Identical
periods of sixty days are fixed for the defendant and the government in
secs. 429 and 430 of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Pro-
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the defendant up to thirty days. Appeal by the government is a
hardship to the defendant, hence the rights of the government
should at the most equal those of the defendant.23 Possibly, however, the rights are not entirely comparable, since the defendant
usually appeals from a conviction, while the government under
existing statutes can never appeal from a'n acquittal.2 4 Moreover,
the defendant takes his appeal at the close of the trial, while the
government takes its appeal before or during trial.
The present Criminal Appeals Rule III, paragraph 3, covering
appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeals, requires that appeals by
the defendant, must be taken within five days after entry of judgment of conviction, except that where a motion for a new trial
has been made within the three day period allowed in Rule II, the
appeal may be taken within five days after the entry of the order
denying the motion. But it has been held that a motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, which may be
made within sixty days after final judgment, does not extend the
time for appeal. 25 If appeal is to be truly available and effective
as to all kinds of injustice done to the defendant, it should be made
available here, too.'" To avoid abuse such appeal, after a certain
period, might be made discretionary with the trial court or the
appellate court.

27

It has just been seen that the five day period prescribed in
Criminal Appeals Rule III is not adequate with respect to appeals
where a motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence is denied. But that is not the only case of inadequacy.
Suppose a motion to correct an illegal sentence is made and denied
after the defendant has served several years in the penitentiary.
Suppose also that a rule of court be adopted permitting a motion
cedure. It should be noted that the present five day period with respect to
appeals by the defendant as laid down in Criminal Appeals Rule III was
a reduction from the prior statutory period of three months.
!--If the government could appeal from the sentence on the ground that
it is illegal, there would then be a case where the rights of the parties
should
be the same.
2
-Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 62-63; 262-266.
2
-'Fewox v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1935) 77 Fed. (2d) 699;
Note,2 (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 984.
'Under sec. 429 of the American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) the defendant may appeal within sixty days after the
denial of a motion for a new trial based on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence.
2Sec. 2 of the Criminal Appeals Rule Making Act, 48 Stat. at L. 399,
18 U. S. C. A. see. 688, 28 U. S. C. A. see. 723a, provides that the
"right of appeal shall continue in those cases in which appeals are now
authorized by law." See note 2, supra. But where new and additional
rights are created it would seem that they might be made discretionary.
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in the trial court for correction of an illegal sentence at any time.
Does not fairness require that the defendant should have the
right to appellate review of the denial of the motion within some
reasonable period after such denial? At least should there not be
the possibility of review if the trial court or the appellate court
in their discretion give leave? The Fifth and the Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals have recently solved the problem by holding
that Criminal Appeals Rule III, paragraph 1, is not applicable
and that the rule in effect prior to the Criminal Appeals Rule must
be resorted to.2 8 The same view was taken by the Supreme Court
2' -s a
whose decision referred to this as a "casus omissus.

A different kind of hardship appears where the defendant is at
Alcatraz and his motion is made in Maine or some other distant
point. Five days after the entry of the order denying the motion
is scarcely adequate though it is certainly much better than five
days after the entry of judgment of conviction.
There is also inadequacy as to cases where the writ of error
coran nobis or its substitute by way of motion is denied. The time
for making that motion is not limited by Rule II ;20 possibly there
is no time limit upon it. Should there not be the possibility of at
least discretionary review in case of denial of the motion? Is it
not clear from all of this that appeals from orders denying motion
for correction of sentence, or motions for new trials on the ground
of newly discovered evidence, or the writ of error coram nobis,
or any other order made after entry of judgment of conviction
should be treated differently than appeals taken from judgment of
conviction, certainly as to the time when the period for taking an
appeal starts to run, and possibly also as to the length of the period
after it has started to run ?
Or, suppose the defendant is not represented by counsel or is
represented by assigned counsel? May not the solution here be
a rule that when the court imposes sentence on such a defendant,
the court must ask the defendant whether he wishes to appeal, and
if he answers in the affirmative, the court must direct the clerk to
file and serve a notice of appeal or must extend the time for such
filing. 30 Another solution may be to permit the appellate court in
28
Meyers v. United States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 116 F. (2d) 601,
603; Gilmore v. United States, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1942) 124 F. (2d) 537.
539. 2
-saUnited States ex rel. Coy v. United States, 316 U. S. 342, 62 Sup. Ct.
1137,2986 L. Ed. 1517.
Robinson v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 998, 1000.
3
oCf. Boykin v. Huff, (U.S. Ct. of App. D. C. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 965,
noted (1941) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 133; (1941) 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 69;
(1942) 27 Wash. U. L. Q. 272.

PROCEDURE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

its discretion to extend the time for taking an appeal as may be
done in England."
A number of problems may arise as to the contents of the
notice of appeal. Under the present Criminal Appeals Rule III,
paragraph 3, the notice must contain a general statement of the
nature of the offense. Perhaps this is unnecessary. Possibly a
brief description of the decision appealed from with its date is
sufficient. The Criminal Appeals Rule requires the notice to contain a "succinct statement of the grounds of the appeal." If the
pattern of the Civil Rules is followed, this requirement may be
dropped and instead there may be substituted a statement of points
as prescribed in Civil Rule 75 (d). The Criminal Appeal Rule
is silent as to signature of the notice of appeal though Forms
No. 1 and 2 call for signature by the appellant. Possibly there
should be an express rule requiring signature by the appellant or
by the attorney for the appellant or by the clerk in the circumstances under which he should be required to prepare it. The
Criminal Appeals Rule III, paragraph 2, abolished petitions for
allowance of appeal and citations. This should perhaps be repeated in the new rules lest it be argued that silence or repeal
of the Criminal Appeals Rule revived the rule existing prior to
the adoption of the Criminal Appeals Rules.

Rule IV. It is possible that Rule IV, paragraph 3, of the
Criminal Appeals Rules dealing with motion to dismiss an appeal
may be modified in such a way as to give greater protection to the
defendant. This might be done by a provision that before dismissing the court shall be free to dispose of the case on the merits
if it finds upon examination of papers on file with the clerk that
serious error has prdbably been committed by the district court. 32
21
lOrfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 126; Criminal Appeals
Act, (1907) seC. 7 (1), paragraph 2.
32Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 271. "IV. Control by
Appellate Court. The clerk of the trial court shall immediately forward the
duplicate notice of appeal to the clerk of the appellate court, together with
a statement from the docket entries in the case substantially as provided
in the form hereto annexed.
"From the time of the filing with its clerk of the duplicate notice of
appeal, the appellate court shall, subject to these rules, have supervision
and control of the proceedings on the appeal including the proceedings relating to the preparation of the record on appeal.
"The appellate court may at any time upon five (5) days' notice, entertain a motion to dismiss the appeal, or for directions to the trial court,
or to vacate or modify any order made by the trial court or by any judge
in relation to the prosecution of the appeal, including any order for the
granting of hail."
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Rule V. On the other hand it may be that Rule V 33 on supersedeas is over lenient to the defendant in making a stay automatic
on the taking of an appeal unless the defendant elects to enter
upon the serving of his sentence. This may encourage frivolous
appeals. Should the defendant not be required to take an affirmative step if he desires a stay? Under the present rules the stay
is automatic unless the defendant elects to begin service of his
sentence.3 4 Would it not be well to provide that where the sentence
is imprisonment, such sentence shall be executed unless not only
has an appeal been taken but the defendant has elected with the
approval of the court to remain in detention pending appeal or
has been admitted to bail; and that where the sentence is a fine
the sentence shall be executed unless not only an appeal has been
taken but execution has been stayed by the District Court or the
Circuit Court of Appeals ?3
' Rue VI. Criminal Appeals Rule VI, dealing with bail, may
perhaps be somewhat improved by adding a provision that the
court granting bail may at any time increase the amount thereof,
or revoke the order admitting the defendant to bail. This would
correspond as to a later stage of the proceeding with the last
sentence of Criminal Appeals Rule I: "Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or continue or increase the amount of
bail." It may also be desirable to provide that appeal bonds are to
be filed in the trial court. Finally, it may be well to adopt for
criminal appeals the simple method now provided for taking
judgment against the sureties on appeal and supersedeas bonds in
civil actions by Civil Rule 73 (f). That is to say the surety by
entering into a bond submits to the jurisdiction of the court and
appoints the clerk of the District Court as his agent for the service
of papers affecting his liability. No independent action is necessary.
Ride IX. One of the important problems of appeal is that of
the docketing of the appeal and the record on appeal. It seems to
33
For rule V, as amended Oct. 21, 1940, see 311 U. S. 731, 61 Sup. Ct.
CLII, 85 L. Ed. 90. "V. Supersedeas. An appeal from a judgment of conviction stays the execution of the judgment, unless the defendant pending
his appeal shall elect to enter upon the service of his sentence. The trial
court or the circuit court of appeals may stay the execution of any sentence
to pay a fine or fine and costs upon such terms as it may deem proper. It
may require the defendant pending the appeal to pay to the clerk in escrow
the whole or any part of such fine and costs, to submit to an examination as to his assets, or to give a supersedeas bond, and it may likewise
make any appropriate order to restrain the defendant from dissipating his
assets34 and thereby preventing the collection of such fine."
Tinkoff v. Zerbst, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1936) 80 F. (2d) 414.
35Cf. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 171-173.
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me that at this point uniformity between civil and criminal cases
is highly desirable. In line with Civil Rule 73 (g), why not provide that the record on appeal must be filed with the appellate
court and the proceeding there docketed within forty days from
the date the notice of appeal is filed in the district court? Hardship in cases where more time is necessary might-be avoided by
a provision that the district court or the appellate court might
for good cause shown extend the time for filing and docketing.
Three questions arise at this point. First, should the district court
have less power than the appellate court to extend the time?
Second, should the extension be applied for within the original
forty-day period? Third, should there be a limit with respect to
the length of the extension that may be granted?
Under Criminal Appeals Rule IX the district judge has less
power than the appellate court to extend the time for the settling
and filing of the bill of exceptions.- 6 Under this same rule the
district judge can extend the time only if he acted within the
thirty-day period normally allowed. But under Criminal Appeals
Rule IV the circuit court of appeal can fix an indefinite period at
any time.3 7 A highly flexible rule would allow either trial or
3"Ray v. United States, (1937) 301 U. S. 158, 162, 57 Sup. Ct. 700, 81
L. Ed. 976; (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 985. "IX. Bill of Exceptions.
In cases other than those described in Rule VIII, the appellant, within thirty
(30) days after the taking of the appeal, or within such further time as
within said period of thirty days may be fixed by the trial judge, shall procure to be settled, and shall file with the clerk of the court in which the
case was tried, a bill of exceptions setting forth the proceedings upon which
the appellant wishes to rely in addition to those shown by the clerk's record
as described in Rule VIII. Within the same time, the appellant shall
file with the clerk of the trial court an assignment of the errors of
which appellant complains. The bill of exceptions shall be settled by the
trial judge as promptly as possible, and he shall give no extension of time
that is not required in the interest of justice.
"Bills of exceptions shall conform to the provisions of Rule 8 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.
"Upon the filing of the bill of exceptions and assignment of errors, the
clerk of the trial court shall forthwith transmit them, together with such
matters of record as are pertinent to the appeal, with his certificate, to
the clerk of the appellate court, and the papers so forwarded shall constitute the record on appeal.
"The appellate court may at any time, on five (5) days' notice, entertain a motion by either party for the correction, amplification, or reduction of the record filed with the appellate court and may issue such directions to the trial court, or trial judge, in relation thereto, as may be
appropriate."
; 7 Ray v. United States, (1937) 301 U. S. 158, 57 Sup. Ct. 700, 81 L.
Ed. 976. Under Civil Rule 6 (b), both the district and the circuit courts
might extend after the expiration of the forty day period. Ainsworth v.
Gill Glass Furniture Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1939) 104 F. (2d) 83; Holtzoff,
Practice Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (1940) 20 Boston
U. L. Rev. 179, 289.
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appellate court to extend the time, would allow them to extend at
any time, and Would allow them to extend for any length of time.
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the existing
criminal rule was adopted because of inexcusably long delays in
the settling and filing of the record.38 Nor should it be forgotten
that under Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, as amended
February 27, 1939, the appellant may set forth the record in full
instead of in narrative form and thus not so much time is needed
in preparing the record.-"
Rules VII, VIII, and IX of the Criminal Appeals Rules still
preserve the old fashioned bill of exceptions and assignment of
errors.40 The Civil Rules have abolished them 41 and permit the
parties to determine the contents of the record on appeal. The
appellant and the appellee designate the portions of the record
which they desire to be transmitted to the appellate court and the
clerk makes up the record according to such designations. The
judge need not approve the record, but settles disputes between
adverse counsel if they arise. It seems to me that a brief rule
is desirable to the effect that the rules governing the preparation
and form of the record in civil cases shall apply to the record on
appeal in criminal cases. The late Federal Circuit Judge Rufus
E. Foster has pointed out that "formerly there was no difference
between the practice on appeal in civil cases at law and criminal
42
cases."
One of the chief problems with respect to the record on appeal
is whether or not it should be printed or how much of it should be
printed. The Criminal Appeals Rules are silent on the matter
though under Rule XII it seems to be left to local rules by the
Circuit Courts of Appeals. Civil Rule 75 (1) expressly leaves
regulation of printing to the Circuit Courts of Appeals. Possibly
3SNote, (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 983, 986; Orfield, Criminal Appeals
in America, (1939) 127-129, 253-254. A study prior to the Rules showed the
average time betveen sentence and filing of the record in the circuit
court as to fifty cases taken in order from the United States Supreme
Court docket to be 188 days. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America
(1939) 127.
39See note, (1939) 52 Harv. L-. Rev. 983, 986; Federal Circuit Judge
Rufus0 E. Foster, Criminal Appeals Rules, (1939) 1 Fed. Rules Dec. 261.
1 Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 156-157, 255-256, 268269. 41
For a concise summary of the changes in appellate procedure brought
about by the adoption of the Civil Rules, see Sunderland (1939) 13 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 129-131.
"2Criminal Appeals Rules, An address by Federal Circuit Judge Rufus
E. Foster at the Judicial Conference of the Fifth Circuit, May 22, 1939,
1 Fed. Rules Dec. 261.
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the time has now come when the Supreme Court itself should
regulate the matter, at least in criminal cases. A number of solutions suggest themselves. The most far reaching of them is to
allow the use of typewritten records on appeal to the Circuit
Courts of Appeals.4 1 In 1936 with respect to civil appeals, only
eleven states required printed records. 44 The saving in expense
and time would be a real benefit to numerous defendants who can
ill afford to pay for printing. A less sweeping change would be a
rule that the appellant should first state the parts of the record he
desires to print, the appellee should then state the parts of the
record which he desires to print, and that the parts of the record
designated by both should be printed in the order in which they
appear in the record. This should give a clear, accurate, realistic
picture of what happened below. In contrast to the appendix
form, it does not divide the record into two parts; it does not by
division produce a discontinuous record. In contrast to the procedure under the present Criminal Appeals Rules this method has
the advantage of individual designation without the necessity of
agreement in the lower court. A third solution is the appendix
form of record.4 1 Under this plan the appellant would print as an
appendix to his brief the judgment appealed from, any opinion
or charge of the court, and such other parts of the record material
to the question presented as the appellant desired the court to
read. The brief of the appellee would contain as an appendix such
parts of the record as the appellee desired the court to read not
printed in the appellant's brief. The appellant might then set forth
in an appendix to the reply brief such additional parts of the
record as he desired the court to read in view of the parts printed
by the appellee. In particular cases the appellate court might order
additional parts or the whole of the record to be printed. The
First, the Third, and the Fourth Circuits, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have adopted such a plan. It
has been used in the Fourth Circuit since 1939 where, according
to Clerk Claude M. Dean, litigants have been saved thousands of
dollars of expense.'
Under Criminal Appeals Rule VI it is possible for a defendant
'4Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 151-156.
"4Ferdinand F. Stone, The Record on Appeal in Civil Cases, (1937), 23

Va. L. Rev. 766, 793.
'43Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939)
41'(1940) 42 North Carolina Bar Association
Federal Circuit Judge John J. Parker, Improving
Justice, (1940) 19 Neb. L. Bull. 185, 195, reprinted
71, 75.

146-147, 155-156.
Reports 71. See also
the Administration of
(1941) 27 A. B. A. J.
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who is denied bail by the district court to "shop around" for bail
by applying to the Circuit Court of Appeals without being required
to state what happened to his prior applications." Under Criminal
Appeals Rule IV the same seems to be true -with respect to extension of time for settling and filing of the bill of exceptions.
Should this not be eliminated by a rule that the application be on
notice and that the application must show either that it is not
practicable to apply to the district court for the relief or that the
application has been made to it and denied with the reasons given
by it for the denial? The Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges has recommended the substance of such a rule.4'
Rule X. Criminal Appeals Rule X provides that preference
"shall be given to criminal appeals over appeals in civil cases."
The congestion of civil cases in some circuits may require special
treatment. For that reason some phraseology like "as far as
practicable" might be added.
Rule XI. Under Criminal Appeals Rule XI petition to the
United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari to review a
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be made within
thirty days after the entry of the judgment of that court. This rule
seems to deprive the court of the power to grant all extensions
whether within the thirty-day period or later. 49 In view of the
tendency towards flexibility with respect to time provisions as
illustrated in Civil Rule 6 (b), in view of proposals that there be
no time limit on applications for new trial on the ground of newlydiscovered evidence, that the time limit for motions in arrest of
judgment or for new trial may be extended if motion is made
during the original three-day limit, that the time limit for with47
But see United States v. Hansell, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1940) 109 F.
(2d) 613. "VI. Bail. The defendant shall not be admitted to bail pending an
appeal from a judgment of conviction save as follows: Bail may be granted
by the trial judge or by the appellate court, or, where the appellate court
is not in session, by any judge thereof or by the circuit justice.
"Bail shall not be allowed pending appeal unless it appears that the
appeal involves a substantial question which should be determined by the
court."
appellate
4
8Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. (1941)
8-9. See also, Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America, (1939) 257.
49
Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States, (1936) secs. 381, 386. "XI. Writ of certiorari, Petition to
the Supreme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari to review
a judgment of the appellate court shall be made within thirty (30) days
after the entry of the judgment of that court. Such petition shall be made
as prescribed in Rules 38 and 39 of the rules of the Supreme Court of
the United States."
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drawal of a plea of guilty be extended up to sentence, that the
time limit for filing an appeal be extended in certain cases where
a defendant is not represented by counsel or represented by counsel assigned to him by the court and that both the trial and appellate courts be authorized to extend the time for filing and
docketing the appeal, it may seem quite logical to authorize the
Supreme Court or a justice thereof for good cause shown to
extend the time for petitions for certiorari. It may be, however,
that experience has indicated that no hardships or injustices arise
out of the present rule. Or it may be that, if the rule is to be
changed, it should be required that applications for extension be
made within thirty days and that the periods for extension be
limited.'('
Ride XIII. The provision in Rule XIII, the final one of the
Criminal Appeals Rules, with respect to time differs with the
corresponding provision of the Civil Rules in Rule 6 (a). 51 Under
Rule 6 (a) when the period of time prescribed is less than seven
days. intermediate Sundays and holidays are to be excluded in
the computation. It would follow that as to a longer period Sundays and holidays would be included thus cutting down the time.
Under Criminal Appeals Rule XIII, on the other hand, Sundays
and holidays are excluded in the computation whether the period
involved was more or less than seven days. Civil Rule 6 (a) treats
half-holidays as ordinary days. The Criminal Appeals Rule is
silent as to half-holidays. To avoid confusion the rule in criminal
cases should be brought into harmony with that in civil.
I have said nothing of the scope of appeal. Should the Circuit
Court, like the English Court of Criminal Appeal, be authorized
to review the facts in the sense of hearing new testimony and new
witnesses ?5 Should the Circuit Court, like several of our state
appellate courts, be authorized to reduce sentences on the ground
that they are criminologically excessive though not illegal ?58 I be---Rule XV of the Proposed Rules transmitted by the Attorney General to the Supreme Court on May 26, 1933, contained this proviso with
respect to the thirty-day period: "Provided, that for good cause shown
such period may be extended not exceeding thirty (30) days by a Justice
(f the Supreme Court."
",Rule XIII, paragraph 2: "For the purpose of computing time as
specified in the foregoing rules, Sundays and legal holidays (whether under
Federal law or under the law of the State where the case was brought)
shall be excluded."
'On review of the facts, see Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America.
(1939) 79-91.
"On review of the sentence, see Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America
1939) 101-121. '
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lieve that Congress can and should do these things.5 4 But it is not
clear that the statute empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe
the Criminal Appeals Rules gives the Court power to act. Section
2 of that Act provides:
"The right of appeal shall continue in those cases in which appeals are now authorized by law, but the rules made as herein
authorized may prescribe the times for and manner of taking
appeals and applying for writs of certiorariand preparing records
and bills of exceptions and the conditions on which supersedeas or
bail may be allowed."
It seems to me that it might be argued in favor of the power to
make rules that the right of appeal will still continue in those
cases in which appeals are now authorized by law and will also
exist in favor of the defendant in a new class of cases where it
does not now exist. It seems to me the statute simply prevents the
destruction of the right to appeal where it now exists but does not
prevent 3the creation of new rights. Furthermore, it might be
argued that prescribing the manner of taking appeals to a certain
extent involves the power to limit the scope of appeal. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure regulated and increased the scope of
appeal in jury-waived cases. 55
5448 Stat. at L. 399, 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 688, 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
723a.
55Shapiro, Criminal Appeal on the Facts and the Federal Judicial

System, (1939) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 332.

